Abstract. Sakai et. al in 2000 produced a method of construction identity based public/private key pairs using pairings on elliptic curves. In 2001, using the same key construction as Sakai et. al., Boneh and Franklin presented the first efficient and provably secure identity-based encryption scheme. In 2003 Sakai and Kasahara proposed another method of constructing identity based keys, also using pairings, which has the potential to improve performance. Later, Chen and Cheng gave a provably secure identity based scheme using this second construction. Both the Boneh-Franklin scheme and the scheme based on the second construction are not true hybrid encryption schemes in the traditional of the public key KEM/DEM approach. To address this issue, Bentahar et. al. extended the idea of key encapsulation mechanism to the identity based setting and presented three constructions in line with the original Sakai et. al. method of constructing identity based keys. In this paper we present another ID-KEM based on the second method of constructing identity based keys and prove its security. The new scheme has a number of advantages over all previous ID-based encryption schemes.
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Preliminary
We first present details on the bilinear groups we require and their underlying hard problems, then in subsection 2.2 we present what is meant by an ID-based encryption scheme and we cover the basic security definitions. Then in 2.3 we present the extension of these ideas to the hybrid setting by recapping on IDKEMs and how one constructs a full IBE scheme by combining an ID-KEM with a DEM.
Bilinear Groups
Our schemes will require groups equipped with a bilinear map. Here we review the necessary facts about bilinear maps and the associated groups using the notation of [5] .
-G 1 , G 2 and G T are (multiplicative) cyclic groups of prime order p.
-g 1 is a generator of G 1 and g 2 is a generator of G 2 .
-ψ is an isomorphism from G 2 to G 1 with ψ(g 2 ) = g 1 .
-ê is a mapê :
The mapê must have the following properties.
Bilinear: For all u ∈ G 1 , all v ∈ G 2 and all a, b ∈ Z we haveê(u a , v b ) = e(u, v)
ab . Non-degenerate:ê(g 1 , g 2 ) = 1. Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to computeê(u, v) for all u ∈ G 1 and v ∈ G 2 .
Note, the map ψ always exists, the issue is whether it can be efficiently computed. For the purposes of defining our schemes we do not assume that ψ is efficiently computable, however our security proofs require the simulator to be able to compute ψ. Hence, following [18] we can either assume that ψ is efficiently computable or make our security proofs relative to some oracle which computes ψ. This property occurs for a number of pairing based cryptographic schemes, but is very rarely pointed out by the authors. Since the publication of [10] many hard problems pertaining to bilinear groups have been suggested for use in the design of cryptosystems. We describe two of these here.
Definition 1 (Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) [3] ) Given group elements (g 1 , g 2 , g
Definition 2 (q-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inverse (q-BDHI) [2] ) Given group elements (g 1 , g 2 , g
It is the last of these on which our scheme's security is based, however we present the BDH problem for when we compare various schemes later on.
ID-Based Encryption Schemes
For an IBE scheme we define the message, ciphertext and randomness spaces by
. These spaces are parametrised by the master public key M pk , and hence by the security parameter t. The scheme itself is specified by four polynomial time algorithms:
A PPT algorithm which takes as input 1 t and returns the master public key M pk and the master secret key M sk .
A PPT private key extraction algorithm which takes as input M pk , M sk and ID A ∈ {0, 1} * , an identifier string for A, and returns the associated private key D ID A .
-E ID (M pk , ID A , m; r): This is the PPT encryption algorithm. On input of an identifier ID A , the master public key M pk , a message m ∈ M ID (M pk ) and possibly some randomness r ∈ R ID (M pk ) this algorithm outputs c ∈ C ID (M pk ).
This is the deterministic decryption algorithm. On input of the master public key M pk , the identifier ID A , the private key D ID A and a ciphertext c this outputs the corresponding value of the plaintext m or a failure symbol ⊥.
Following Boneh and Franklin [3] we can define various security notions for an IBE scheme. All are based on one of the following two-stage games, between an adversary A of the encryption algorithm and a challenger.
In the above, s is some state information and O ID are oracles to which the adversary has access. There are various possibilities for these oracles depending on the attack model for our game:
-CPA Model: In this model the adversary only has access to a private key extraction oracle which on input of ID = ID * will output the corresponding value of D ID . -CCA2 Model: In this model the adversary has access to the private key extraction oracle as above, but it also has access to a decryption oracle with respect to any identity ID of its choice, but with only one restriction that in the second phase A is not allowed to call the decryption oracle with the pair (c * , ID * ).
If we let MOD denote the mode of attack, either CPA or CCA2, the adversary's advantage in the first game is defined to be
while the advantage in the second game is given by
An IBE algorithm is considered to be secure, in the sense of a given goal and attack model (ID-IND-CCA2 for example) if, for all PPT adversaries, the advantage in the relevant game is a negligible function of the security parameter t.
To cope with probabilistic ciphers, we will require that not too many choices for r encrypt a given message to a given ciphertext. To formalise this concept we let γ(M pk ) be the least upper bound such that
( 1) for every ID, m ∈ M PK (M pk ) and c ∈ C PK (M pk ). Our requirement is that the quantity γ(M pk )/|R PK (M pk )| is a negligible function of the security parameter.
ID-Based Key Encapsulation Mechanisms
Following Cramer and Shoup's formalization of hybrid encryption [8] , Bentahar et. al. [4] extended the hybrid encryption concept to identity-based schemes. The idea is to construct an ID-IND-CCA2 secure IBE scheme from an ID-IND-CCA2 secure ID-KEM and a secure DEM. An ID-KEM scheme is specified by four polynomial time algorithms:
. A PPT algorithm which takes as input 1 t and returns the master public key M pk and the master secret key M sk .
A PPT algorithm which takes as input M pk , M sk and an identifier string for A, ID A ∈ {0, 1} * , and returns the associated private key D ID A .
. This is the PPT encapsulation algorithm. On input of ID A and M pk this outputs a pair (k, c) where k ∈ K ID−KEM (M pk ) is a key and c ∈ C ID−KEM (M pk ) is the encapsulation of that key.
. This is the deterministic decapsulation algorithm.
On input of M pk , ID A , c and D ID A this outputs k or a failure symbol ⊥.
We shall only require one security definition for our ID-KEMs, although other weaker definitions can be defined in the standard way. Consider the following two-stage game between an adversary A of the ID-KEM and a challenger.
In the above s is some state information and O ID denotes oracles to which the adversary has access. We shall be interested in the CCA2 attack model where the adversary has access to two oracles 1. A private key extraction oracle which, on input of ID = ID * , will output the corresponding value of D ID . 2. A decapsulation oracle which, on input an identity ID and encapsulation of its choice, will return the encapsulated key. This is subject to the restriction that in the second phase A is not allowed to call this oracle with the pair (c * , ID * ).
The adversary's advantage is defined to be
An ID-KEM is considered to be secure, if for all PPT adversaries A, the advantage in the game above is a negligible function of the security parameter t.
Hybrid IBE
For definitions of DEMs and their security definitions we refer to [8] and [4] . We assume that the keys output by the KEM are from the same key space used by the DEM. To generate M pk , for the hybrid IBE scheme, the algorithm G ID−KEM (1 t ) is run. The algorithms (E SK , D SK ) are then added to the resulting master public key. We denote the resulting full key M pk below. Key extraction for E just uses the key extraction of E 1 . Some IND-CCA secure DEMs are readily available, see [14] and [1] . Bentahar et al. presented two secure ID-KEMs using the same key format as that used in the original BF-IBE scheme. In the following section, we introduce another ID-KEM based on Sakai and Kasahara's IBE proposal which has the potential to achieve even better performance.
In this section we will describe a new concrete construction for an ID-KEM. Our construction is in two stages, in the first stage we present a concrete instantiation of a new ID-OW-CPA secure IBE scheme. One should think of this construction as analogous to the BasicIdent scheme in [3] .
Then, in the second stage, we use a generic construction from [4] which turns an ID-OW-CPA secure IBE scheme into an ID-IND-CCA2 secure ID-KEM.
Stage 1 : An ID-OW-CPA IBE scheme based on Sakai-Kasahara keys
Let t be the security parameter. We will assume that there are groups G 1 , G 2 and G T , as defined in Section 2.1, with order p ≈ 2 t . As in Section 2.1, g 1 is a generator of G 1 , g 2 is a generator of G 2 andê : G 1 × G 2 → G T is a bilinear pairing. We have g 1 = ψ(g 2 ). The scheme also requires two hash functions
n is the message space. It works as follows.
p at random and set R = p s 1 . The value s is the secret key M sk of the TA (a trusted authority), while R along with the other system parameters is the public key M pk . -X ID (M pk , ID, s). This outputs the identity-based secret key
We now present the security result for the IBE scheme above. Theorem 2. Suppose that there is algorithm A which breaks the above scheme in terms of ID-OW-CPA. If we model H 1 and H 2 as random oracles, and we let q 1 , q 2 and q X be the number of queries that A makes to H 1 , H 2 and its key extraction oracle respectively. Then there is an algorithm B to solve the q-BDHI problem with q = q 1 + q X + 1 such that
The proof of this theorem is given in the appendix.
Stage 2: Generic Reduction
Here we take a generic probabilistic ID-based encryption scheme, which is secure in the sense of ID-OW-CPA. Let the encryption algorithm be denoted E ID (M pk , ID, m; r) and the decryption algorithm be denoted
where D ID is the output from the extraction algorithm X ID−KEM (M pk , M sk , ID).
We assume the message space of E ID is given by M ID (M pk ) and the space of randomness is given by R ID (M pk ). The construction uses two cryptographic hash functions:
κ for some κ ∈ Z. Using this we construct an ID-KEM as follows:
From [4] we have the following theorem concerning the security of the construction above.
Theorem 3.
If E ID is an ID-OW-CPA secure ID-based encryption scheme and H 3 and H 4 are modelled as random oracles then the construction above is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. Specifically, if A is a PPT algorithm that breaks the ID-KEM construction above using a chosen ciphertext attack, then there exists a PPT algorithm B, with
where q 3 , q 4 and q D are the number of queries made by A to H 3 , H 4 and the decryption oracle respectively, and γ(M pk ) is as in (1).
When we instantiate this generic construction with our ID-OW-CPA scheme from Stage 1, we have
Full Scheme
The full ID-KEM scheme works as follows. The algorithms G ID−KEM and X ID−KEM are simply G ID and X ID for the IBE scheme above.
Note thatê(p 1 , p 2 ) can be included in the public key to save on pairings.
We now look at the validity check in more detail. We need to ensure that the following holds
where
In particular this means that checking whether V is correct is redundant. Hence, we only need to check whether U = Q r . Since the decryptors know their own identity, they can be assumed to have precomputed the value of Q. Hence, the validity check involves only one exponentiation in G 1 .
Comparison with Other Schemes
In this section we compare the ID-IND-CCA2 scheme from the previous section, which we denote by SK-C2, with the other efficient ID-based encryption schemes in the literature -BF-IBE : This is the original Boneh-Franklin scheme which is secure assuming the BDH problem is hard. The ID-based keys are constructed in the standard way by hashing to a point in either G 1 or G 2 . The associated secret key is obtained by multiplying this point by the master secret. We use BF-IBEa to denote the extension of the Boneh-Franklin scheme to the use of an arbitrary block cipher as opposed to the more traditional xor, in [4] this latter version is referred to as FullIdent-2. Note, BF-IBEa does not need to be used with a full DEM, but simply a weaker standard block cipher secure against passive attacks only. -SK-IBE : This is the method given in [6] . This uses the keys construction of Sakai and Kasahara as in the current paper. The scheme is secure assuming the q-BDHI problem is hard. Similar to BF-IBEa, we can define an SK-IBEa.
-BF-C1 : Construction C-1 from [4] is a hybrid KEM based construction, originally mentioned in paper by Lynn [11] . It is secure assuming a suitable gap problem is hard. The keys are the same as in the Boneh-Franklin scheme. -BF-C2 : Construction C-2 from [4] uses the generic construction used in this paper, but with the BasicIdent scheme of [3] as its ID-OW-CPA scheme.
Note, all of the above scheme are secure in the random oracle model. We have not considered comparisons against schemes secure in the standard model as they are very inefficient.
To compare efficiency we first look at computational efficiency, the first two lines of the table correspond to IBE schemes, whilst the last three refer to ID-KEM/DEM hybrid constructions. We assume obvious precomputations have been performed in all cases.
We see that the schemes based on the Sakai-Kasahara key construction do not have to perform a pairing in their encryption routine. This comes at the expense of an extra group exponentiation, however these are usually much cheaper than a pairing computation. In addition we note that using the Sakai-Kasahara method of constructing keys, as opposed to the method of Boneh and Franklin avoids needing to hash into an elliptic curve group. As pointed out in [18] hashing into the group can cause problems if the groups are not chosen in a suitable way. In addition hashing into an elliptic curve is in general more expensive both in terms of CPU time and code footprint size than hashing into the integers. We reiterate that using an ID-KEM/DEM construction is more flexible as it allows the use of identity based encryption with an arbitrary method to encrypt the actual data packet, or even the use of the KEM on its own to transmit a key for another application. This philosophy for designing public key encryption algorithms is well explained in [8] and [14] , so we do not go into the benefits more here.
We now turn to the ciphertext sizes of the various schemes above. In the following table we let |G 1 | etc denote the number of bits needed to represent an element in the group G 1 . It is convention that when instantiated with elliptic curves, the group G 1 refers to the subgroup of order p of an elliptic curve over the "small" finite field. Then for supersingular elliptic curves we have G 1 = G 2 , however for so-called MNT curves we have that G 2 is related to a subgroup of the twisted elliptic curve over a large finite field. Hence, representing elements of G 2 can require more bits than elements of G 1 .
In the following table we also mention whether the scheme requires hashing into either the group G 1 or the group G 2 . One should note that hashing into G 2 can be computationally expensive as pointed out in [18] for certain choices of groups, whilst hashing into G 1 is usually very efficient. As in [12] we let BF-IBE ⊥ etc, denote the protocol BF-IBE but with the roles of G 1 and G 2 reversed. Note, reversing the roles of G 1 and G 2 can have effects on the security proof or on other aspects related to efficiency, see [18] for more details. In addition reversing the roles of G 1 and G 2 only makes no difference for supersingular elliptic curves. We do not give rows for the Sakai-Kasahara based schemes with swapped roles of G 1 and G 2 , as reversing the roles of G 1 and G 2 only reduces bandwidth efficiency for no gain in performance, as for these schemes one never has to hash into G 1 or G 2 .
Message
Hashing
In the above table n either refers to the key length of the DEM, or the size of σ in the standard BF-IBE etc. We note that for the schemes with Boneh-Franklin style keys one either needs to choose, for MNT curves, between low bandwidth and hashing into G 2 , or high bandwidth and hashing into G 1 .
Bandwidth for ciphertexts can be further reduced as follows: In the ciphertext we transmit the element U ∈ G 1 , which is a point on an elliptic curve in practice. We could clearly compress the point U . However, compression usually entails sending an extra bit so as to uniquely decompress the point. This is unnecessary for the cost of one field inversion. Suppose we only transmit the x-coordinate of the point U , in which case the receiver only knows U upto sign. Hence, he can only compute α←ê(±U, D ID ) ±1 .
But by computing
a unique value will be produced. In particular this technique avoids the need to transmit an extra bit to uncompress the x-coordinate x(U ) to a unique point, and it does not affect the security proof. One does, obviously, have to also modify the validity check slightly.
A Proof of Theorem 2
To prove our theorem we will show how to use A to construct an algorithm B to solve the q-BDHI problem, where q = q 1 + q X + 1. Algorithm B proceeds as follows: It takes as input (g 1 , g 2 , g Note that if p 2 = 1 then we have that x = −h i for some value of i and hence we can solve the q-BDHI problem, by first checking which value of h i corresponds to x and then solving the problem directly. We also define the polynomials Now set
(g
